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In the Supreme Court ofthe State of Idaho

MARKVAN,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

)
)
)
)

v.

PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,

)
)

Defendant-Respondent-Cross
Appellant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 38793-2011
Bannock County Docket No. 2005-4053

)
)

RESPONDENT PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
RECORD and an AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA M. OLSSON IN SUPPORT OF PMC'S MOTION
TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD were filed by counsel for Respondent on July 2, 2013. Therefore,
good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S MOTION SUPPLEMENT RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED in part, and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, file-stamped October 17, 2005;
2. Judgment, file-stamped November 9, 2007.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
RECORD be and hereby is, DENIED in part, without prejudice, as the documents listed below do not
bear a legible file stamp.
1. · Answer to Complaint.
2. Memorandum Decision and Order
DATED this

AUG

~day of July, 2013.
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

MARK VAN,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

ORDER GRANTING RENEWED
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD

)
)

v.

)
Supreme Court Docket No. 38793-2011
Bannock County Docket No. 2005-4053

)

PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,

)
)

Defendant-Respondent-Cross
Appellant.

RESPONDENT

PORTNEUF

)
)

MEDICAL

CENTER'S

RENEWED

MOTION

TO

SUPPLEMENT RECORD and an AFFIDAVIT OF JETTA HATCH MATHEWS IN SUPPORT OF
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER'S RENEWED MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD were
filed by counsel for Respondent on July 9, 2013. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S

RENEWED MOTION TO

SUPPLEMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and the augmentation record shall include
the documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Answer to Complaint, file-stamped April 11, 2006; and
2. Memorandum Decision, Order and Judgment, file-stamped October 31, 2007.
DATED this

IJ-

day of July, 2013.
For the Supreme Court

cc: Counsel ofRecord

ORDER GRANTING RENEWED MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD
38793-2011
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Patricia M. Olsson, ISB No. 3055
Paul D. McFarlane, ISB No. 7093
MOFFATT, 'THOMAS, BARRETT, RoCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 1Otb Floor
P. 0. Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208)345-2000
Facsimile (208)385-5384
pmo@moffatt.com
pdm@moffatt.com
13-782.178

.r,.

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MARK. VAN,
Case No. CV 2005-4053 OC
Plaintiff,

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

r.-t-a.. $ sz..O()

vs.
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, PAT
HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator,
PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director,
GARY ALZOIA, Director of Operations,
RON FERGIE, ChiefPilot/Safety Officer,
BARRY NIELSON, Pilot, and DOES I-X,

fd~

Defendants.

COME NOW the defendants, PortneufMedical Center (''PMC'), Pat Hennanson,

·.

-. .
Hospital Administrator ("Hennanson"), Pam Humphrey, EMS Program Director ("Humphrey''),
Gary Alzola, Director of Operations ("Alzola"), Ron Fergie, ChiefPilot/Safety Officer

..Jo
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("Fergie"), and Barry Nielson, Pilot ("Nelson") (collectively, "Defendants"), by and through
undersigned colUlSel, and answer plaintiff Mark Van's ("Plaintiff') Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial ("Complaint") as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint, and each and every count therein, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff's
Complaint that is not specifically and expressly admitted herein.

PARTIES
1.

The answering Defendants admit Paragraphs I, II, ill, N, V, VI, and Vll

ofPlaintiffs Complaint.
2.

The anS\vering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in

Paragraph Vffi of Plaintiff's Complaint.

JURISDICfiON AND VENUE
3.

In response to paragraph IX ofPlaintiffs Complaint, the answering

Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in
their entirety.
4.

Paragraph X ofPlaintiffs Complaint calls for legal conclusions and,

therefore, no response is required. Should the answering Defendants be required to respond,

they would admit that jurisdiction and venue in this Court are proper.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 2
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FACTUAL BASIS FOR CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

In response to paragraph XI of Plaintiffs Complaint, the answering

5.

Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in
their entirety.
6.

The answering Defendants admit Paragraph XII of Plaintiff's Complaint.

7.

The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in

Paragraphs Xlll, XIV, XV, XVI, XVTI, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, and XXIV of
Plaintiff's Complaint.
COUNT I
WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

8.

In response to paragraph XXV of Plaintiff's Complaint, the answering

Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in
their entirety.
9.

The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in

Paragraph XXVI ofPlainti:ff's Complaint.
COUNT IT
BREACH OF CONTRACT

10.

In response to paragraph XXVII of Plaintiff's Complaint, the answering

Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in
their entirety.
11.

The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in

Paragraph XXVIII of Plaintiff's Complaint.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 3
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DAMAGES
12.

In response to paragraph XXIX of Plaintiff's Complaint, the answering

Defendants incorporate by reference their responses to the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in
their entirety.
13.

The answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in

Paragraphs XXX, XXXI, XXXll, and XXXJII of Plaintiffs Complaint.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
14.

The answering Defendants deny Plaintiff's prayer for relief
THIRD DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims are time barred under Idaho Code section 6-2101, et seq.
FOURTH DEFENSE
The Plaintiff's claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the actions
complained of, if and to the extent they occurred, were the lawful exercise of discretion and were
undertaken in good faith and for lawful, legitimate business reasons.
FIFTH DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because even if the
Defendants' actions with respect to Plaintiff are subsequently determined to have been wrongful,
the Defendants' actions were at all times based upon a reasonable, good-faith belief that such
actions were lawful.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because Defendants'
conduct in this matter was at all times privileged and based upon business necessity.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT· 4
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SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs action is barred, either in whole or in part, because Plaintiff's claims
were processed through Defendant's internal complaint procedures and appropriate action was
taken.

EIGHTH DEFENSE
The damages prayed for in Plaintiff's Complaint and the cause of action alleged
against the answering Defendants arise out of and stem from activities for which said Defendants
are immune from liability by virtue of Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho Code, and therefore, Plaintiff's
cause of action and the damages alleged are barred by virtue of Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho Code.

NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, because the terms of any
employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant was materially breached and repudiated
by Plaintiff; therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to no relief upon any such contract.

TENTH DEFENSE
Any claim based upon breach of contract and/or breach of any alleged implied
covenant of such contract is barred to the extent Plaintiff has failed to fulfill any contractual
conditions precedent.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was reciprocal, and any
claims based upon a breach of such covenant are barred, either in whole or in part, because
Plaintiff materially breached said covenant.

TWELFTH DEFENSE
The amounts the Plaintiff claims are due and owing for lost wages and/or benefits
must be reduced and offset by any amounts (including unemployment insurance benefits) that

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 5
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the Plaintiff earned or could have earned with the exercise of reasonable diligence during the
period for which lost earnings are sought by the Plaintiff.

THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred, either in whole or in part, by the equitable doctrines
of either estoppel, waiver, laches, and/or unclean hands.

FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims are barred by failure to provide these answering Defendants
with reasonable ~pportunity to cure any alleged breach of duty.

FIFfEENTH DEFENSE
IfPlaintiffhas sustained injuries or losses as alleged in the Complaint, upon
information and belief, such injuries or losses were caused, in whole or in part, through the
operation of other intervening and/or superseding cause or causes.

SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs alleged damages, if any, are limited, either in whole or in part, by the
limitation of non-economic damages as provided by Idaho Code section 6-1603.

SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
Any recovery to which Plaintiff might otherwise be entitled in this action is
subject to the provisions ofldaho Code section 6-1606 prohibiting double recoveries from
collateral sources.

EIGHTEENTIJ DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from recovery, in whole or in part, by his failure to mitigate
damages.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 6
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NINETEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims may be barred, in whole or in part, by Plaintiff's own conduct,
including, without limitation, his own contributory negligence.
TWENTIETH DEFENSE
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim for relief against answering Defendants
for emotional distress and/or other damages arising out of any alleged physical or emotional
injury or disability, or a claim for relief against answering Defendants for pwportedly causing

his alleged physical or emotional injury or disability during the course and scope of his
employment, Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by Idaho Code sections 72-201, 72-209 and 72-211,
which are the exclusive remedy provisions of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, Idaho
Code sections 72-101 -72-806.
TWEN1Y-F1RST DEFENSE
Defendants are entitled to recover their attorney's fees for their defense of
Plaintiff's action pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123, and pursuant to
Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
TWENTY-SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiff's damages, if any, are limited by the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
Section 1981a(b).
TWENTY-THIRD DEFENSE
Discovery is ongoing in this matter and Defendants respectfully reserve the right
to amend and/or supplement their answer as may be necessary.
ATTORNEY FEES
The answering Defendants have been required to retain an attorney to defend this
action and are entitled to recover their attorney fees incurred in the defense of this action

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 1
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pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and any
other applicable law.

WHEREFORE, the answering Defendants pray:
1.

That Plaintiff take nothing by his Complaint, and that the Complaint in

this action be dismissed, with prejudice;
2.

For their costs and reasonable attorney fees; and

3.

For such other and further relief as the court deems proper.

DATED this 1Oth day of April, 2006.
MOFFAIT, THOMAS, BARRETI, Roc

~~~~D
Patricia M. Olsson Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1Oth day of April, 2006, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
David E. Gabert, Esq.
Attorney at Law
845 West Center, Suite C
Post Office Box 4267
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4267
Facsimile (208) 232-8001

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT· 9

(v{u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MMOCVm,

)

PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, PAT
HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator,

)
)
)
)
)

PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director,

)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C

MEMORANDUM DECISION,
ORDER and JUDGMENT

GARY ALZOLA, Director of Opemtions,
)
RON FERGIE, ChiefPilot!Safety Officer, BARRY)
NlELSON, Pilot, and DOES I-X,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This case comes before thls Court pursuant to a Motion for Reconsideration of Court's
Order Gmnting Defendants' Motion for Protective Order ("Motion to Reconsider") filed by
Mark Van ("Plaintiff" or "Mr. Van'') and a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Portneuf
Medical Center ("PMC") and numerous named employee Defendants (hereinafter ''the
Defendants") against the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider specifically seeks review of this Court's Order
"prohibit[ing] Plaintiff :from conducting any further discovery as to Request for Production No.
27 of Plaintiff's Second Set ofinterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents."
(Mot. for Reconsid. of Court's Order Granting Defs.' Mot for Protective Order ("Mot. for
Recons.", Sept. 10, 2007, 1.) Request for Production No. 27 sought "a copy of the Component
Overhaul and Maintenance Program for the Life Flight Progmm ('COMP contract')." (Jd. at 2.)
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Dtifendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
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'

I

The Defendants objected to this request "as overly broad, vague, unduly burdensome, not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and outside the scope of
plaintiffs issues in the lawsuit." (/d.) The Plaintiff argues such objections are without merit
because:
The request was specific and limited in scope and certainly would not have been
burdensome for Defendants to comply. Furthermore, the contract is absolutely relevant.
It is critical for Plaintiff to have the document in order to establish one ofthe facets ofhis
claim that Defendants did waste Bannock County taxpayers' money.

(Id.) The Plaintiff argues this "Court's Order prohibiting disclosure of the COMP contract was
not based on the merits, but was issued as a result of an error on the part of Plaintiff's previous
counsel." (!d. at 3.) The Plaintiff's previous counsel failed to respond to or othenvise oppose
the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order.
Pursuant to their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants are arguing that the
Plaintiff's WIOngful temrination claims against the Defendants should be dismissed because the
Plaintiff
failed to file a Notice of Tort Claim within 180 days of his termination (as required by
Idaho Code Section 6-906). Moreover, Van cannot show any public policy violated by
PMC, cannot show that Van engaged in any protected activity under the state
whistleblower statute, and cannot show any nexus between any such alleged conduct and
his termination. Finally, Van's breach of conlract chriros should be dismissed, as he was
an employee at will and not subject to an express or implied employment contract that
specified the duration of employment.
(Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Sunun. J. ("'Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J."), Aug. 3, 2007, 1 .)
This Court heard oral arguments regarding the above matters on September 24, 2007,
taking the motions under advisement. After receiving oral arguments and reviewing the entire

Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C
Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Defondants' Motion/or Swnmury Judgment
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file, including the briefs filed by counsel, this Court enters the following Memorandum Decision

and Order.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVlEW

Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with the
party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963
(1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and
draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel v. Boise City Hous.
Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). Ifthe evidence reveals no disputed issues of
material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho
434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).
If the moving party challenges an element of the non~moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90,
867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted jn favor of the moving party when the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31~ 887 P.2d at
1037-38; Badell v. Beek-;, 115 Idaho 101,102,765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing the
summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
Memorandum Decision aod Order
Case No. CV -2005-4053-0C
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pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56( e) (emphasis
added).
ISSUES

1. Whether to grant the Defendants• Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. Whether to grant the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
3. Whether the Defendants are entitled to costs and fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Plaintiff began his employment with PMC on May 1, 1986, as a mechanic with the
Life Flight program. On October 12, 1997, he became the director of maintenance of Life Flight
and became responsible for the maintenance ofPMC's Life Flight helicopter. The Plaintiff was
an at-wil1 employee. On November 14, 2001, the Life Flight helicopter crashed in the course of
a rescue mission. The Plaintiff was a witness to that crash and rescued the pilot. The Plaintiff
had worked on the helicopter prior to the crash, fixing a fuel transfer pump. Ultimately, the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the crash was caused by pilot error
and was unrelated to maintenance issues. However, Mr. Van seemed to believe that the media
blamed the crash on the maintenance department, and PMC refused to release information
explaining to the media that the maintenance department was not responsible for the accident.
By all accounts, Mr. Van's relationship with PMC management and the Life Flight pilots
deteriorated following the crash, with the Plaintiff growing more frustrated and distrustful. In

Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C
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August of2003, Mr. Van authored Life Flight Maintenance Policy No. 12, a document that
portrays the Plaintiffs state of mind. Pertinent excerpts from that document follow:
This leiter pertains to the release of aircraft to pilots after maintenance events.
On 11114/01 our helicopter had an accident due to pj lot error. Life Flight
Maintenance was blamed for the accident. The press release was Life Flight helicopter
crashes after maintenance. I fought long and hard to get the NTSB report released. From
this point forth we need to monitor the state of the pilots and question what they do, to
avoid a repeat of that very bad situation!

1t is apparent to me now, that the new Program Director, Director of Operations
and the Chief pilot will shift the blame to Maintenance, even if they have infonnation that
will clear Maintenance of any wrong doing. They will be dishonest with Administration
to attain their end to cover for the pilots at any costs. J am sorry to say that we have an us
against them scenario fostered by the aforementioned staff.
[ am cordial with them and do not wish to foster a us against them situation but
you must always remember that if it' s a decision they have to make (pilot against
mechanic) you are going to take the hit. I have been striving to change this. I will
continue to try until security escorts me off the property. They will gang up on you and
make little to no sense to attain the end they desire. It has happened to me on 5 separate
occasions.

***
Since the powers that be conspired to shift the blame to our department for Tim's
accident. [sic] I feel it is our responsibility to baby sit the pilots and question there [sic]
fitness flight, or any other pilot activities that could cause a situation that could blacken
our reputations or the programs. The only thing I could be guilty of with Tim's accident
was letting him take off after I made my repairs. I will not in the future, let pilots fly
away after maintenance if I feel the aircraft is at risk. I want you to cover your ass and
follow this policy also.

***
(Ex. F- Life Flight Maintenance Policy Letter 12, attached to Aff. of Paul D. McFarlane
("McFarlane Aff."), Aug. 3, 2007.) Various meetings were held to discuss Mr. Van's concerns,

Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C
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I

however, he continued to have issues with the management of Life Flight and felt his concerns
went unresolved. In April of2005, another meeting was held to discuss Mr. Van's issues. After
tbis meeting, Life Flight management and PMC officials conducted an investigation to gauge the
viability of the Life Flight program and determined "[t]he [Life Flight) program was in a state of
severe dysfunction due to Van's serious trust issues with pilots, his superiors, and others, and
because he was unable to move on from the resolution of issues unless the resolution was
entirely of his own making." (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 17.) Thereafter, on April 20, 2005,
the Plaintiff was terminated.

The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 17, 2005, alleging that he had been fired for
reporting safety and operational violations and other misconduct of his fellow employees. (See
Compl., Oct. 17,2005, 8.) Count I oftbe Complaint alleged wrongful termination of
employment. Count II alleged breach of contract
DISCUSSION

A.

Whether to grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
1.

Whether tbe Plaintiff must comply with tbe Idaho Tort Claims Act

PMC first argues that the Plmntiff's ''wrongful termination claim js barred because he
failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act." (Mem. in Supp. of
Summ. J. at 20.) The Plaintiff disputes that claim, arguing that a public employee is not required
to file a notice of tort claim in order to preserve his claims of wrongful termination under the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees (Whistleblower) Act. (Pl.'s Mem. in Resp. to Summ. J.
("Mem. in Resp. to Summ. J. "), Sept. 11, 2007, 25-26.) The Plaintiff contends that lris "cause of
Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C
Re: Plainlijjs Motion for Reconsideration and Difendants' Motion for Summary JudgmenJ
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action for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy enunciated [inJ the
Whistleblower's Act is a contract action, not a tort action.... Furthermore, nothing in the
Whistleblower's Act requires a claimant to file a Notice of Tort Claim." (Id. at 27.) Thus,
because the Plaintiff argues his action for wrongful termination "is a contract action, no Notice
of Tort Claim was necessary ... _, (Jd. at 28.)
PMC is a governmental entity or political subdivision covered under the ITCA. Section
6~906

of that Statute imposes a notice requirement for the filing of a claim against governmental

entities. That section states in pertinent part: "All claims against a political subdivision arising
under the provisions of this act ... shall be presented to and :fiied with the clerk or secretary of
the political subdivision within. one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or
reasonably should have been discovered. whichever is later." A "claim" is defined in JC § ~902

as:
any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or its
employee which any person is legally entitled to recover under this act as
compensation for the negligent or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a
governmental entity or its employee when acting within the course or scope of his
employment.
In turn. section 6-907 describes the contents of a claim:

All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity shall accurately
describe the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or
damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury or
damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, and shall
contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a statement of the actual
residence of the claimant at the time of presenting and :filing the claim and for a
period of six (6) months immediately prior to the time the claim arose. .. _ A
claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid or
insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause
Memorandum Decision 11nd Order
Case No. CV~2005-4053-0C
Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Defendants' Moffon for Summary Judgmem
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of the claim, or otherwise, uDless it is shown that the governmental entity was in
fact misled to its injury thereby.
Pursuant to section 6-909, after a notice of claim is filed, the governmental entity has 90 days to
approve or deny the claim. A claim is deemed denied if it is not approved or denied within that

90~day period. 1 A lawsuit in district court against the governmental entity is only permitted once
a claim is denied?
The purpose of the ITCA is to '(1) save needless expense and litigation by providing an
opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow authorities to
conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the extent oftbe
state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses.' Cobb ley v. City of Challis,
138 Idaho 154, 157, 59 P.3d 959, 962 (2002) (quoting Friel v. Boise City Housing Auth., 126
Idaho 484,486, 887 P.2d29, 31 (1994)). "[T]he claim filing statute is usually the only sure and
certain means by which the state or its subdivisions may be alerted to potential liability arising
from a governmental activity.' Friel, 126 Idaho at 486, 887 P.2d at 31 (quoting Cook v. State, 83
Wasb.2d 599,603,521 P.2d 725,728 (1974)). "The failure to file within theiTCA time
limitation acts as a bar to any further action." Cobbley, 138 Idaho at 157, 59 P.3d at 962 (citing

McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho 719, 722,747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987)).

1

6-909. Time for allowance or denial of claims- Effect of failure to act. • Within ninety {90) days after the

filing of the claim against the governmental entity or its employee. the governmental entity shall act thereon and
notify the claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of
the ninety (90) day period the governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the claim.
2

6-916. Suit on denied claims permitted. If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district

court against the governmental entity or its employee in those circumstances where an action is permitted by tbis act.
Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C
Re; Platntijf's Motion /fN' Reconsideration ami Defendants' Molion for Summary Judgmenl
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As explained, the ITCA requires that 41 (a]ll claims ... arising under the provisions of this
act ... shall be presented to and filed with ... the political subdivision within one hundred (180)
days from the date the claim arose" and that a lawsuit may not be instituted until a claim is
denied.

IDAHO CODE ANN.§§

6-906, 6-909-10 (2007). Compliance with the ITCA is mandatory

for all claims, including those under the Whistleblower Act, because a "claim" under the ITCA is
defined as "any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or its
employee which any person is legally entitled to recover ... as compensation for the negligent or
otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity or its employee when acting within

the course or scope of his employment." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-902(7) (2007).
While the Plaintiff argues his claim for wrongful termination was brought under the

public policy exception to at-will employment and is therefore an action in contract and not
subject to the ITCA, liability under the Wbistleblower Act is not predicated on the breach of the
employment at-will contract. The Whistleblower Act provides that an employee can bring an
action for damages against his or her public employer. "Damages" is defined as "damages for
injury or loss caused by each violation of this chapter ...." IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2105(1),(2)

(2007). Additionally, the language ofthe Whistleblower Act indicates that the Idaho Legislature
intended to create a cause of action separate from the public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine. Specifically, section 6·2101 explains that the Whistleblower Act was
created to provide "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse action
from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation."
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (2007).
Memorandum Deeision and Order
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The Plaintiff's wrongful temrination claims, including his whistleblower chrims, are
covered under the Idaho Tort Claims Act since the Whistleblower Act created an action separate
from the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine and is not exempt from the
notice requirements of the ITCA. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that PMC wrongfully
terminated hls employment in violation of public policy and Idaho Code§ 6-2101, and, as a
result, be suffered damages including lost wages and benefits, decreased earning capacity,
relocation costs and emotional distress and suffering. (See Compl.

at~~

XXVI, XXX.) The

Plaintiffs empJoyment was terminated on April20, 2005. Thereafter, Mr. Van brought a
"claim" for money damages against his public employer. Pursuant to IC § 6-906, he was
required to ille a notice of claim with the hospital or the county clerk within 180 days. l1 is
undisputed that the Plaintiff failed to comply with this notice requirement. As such, PMC was
denied its opportunity to "conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to
determine the extent of ... liability, if any, and ... prepare defenses." That is in violation of the
purpose of the ITCA. Since "[t]he failure to file within the ITCA time limitation acts as a bar to
any further action," the Defendants' request for summary judgment on the ground that the
Plaintiff failed to honor the requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is hereby GRANTED and
the Plaintiffs tort claims, including his claims for emotional distress, are dismissed.
2.

Whether the Plaintiff's wrongful terminl!tion claim under IC § 6-2101 fails.

PMC next argues that the Plaintiffs wrongful termination claim under IC § 6-2101 fails
because the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he engaged in activity protected under the Act or
that be was terminated because be reported government waste or violations of law. (Mem. in
Memorandum Deeisioo and Order

10

Case No. CV-2005-4053-0C
Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Difendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

000672

Supp. ofSumm. J. at 24.) The Plaintiff maintains he was discriminated against for raising safety
and waste issues. (Mem. in Resp. to Summ. J. at 29.)
As explained, the Idaho Protection of Public Employees (Whistleblower) Act was
enacted to provide a cause of action for public employees who suffer adverse action from their
employer as a result of reporting waste and violation of a law, rule or regulation. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 6-2101 (2007). In order to establish a prima facie case under the Wbistleblower Act, the

public employee "must demonstrate he or she engaged or intended to engage in activity protected
by the statute, be or she suffered an adverse employment action, and there is a causal connection
between the protected activity and the employer's adverse action." Curlee v. Kootenai County

Fire & Rescue, No. 32794, 2007 WL 1501383, at *4, (Idaho Ct. App. May 24, 2007).
Idaho Code§ 6-21 04(1Xa) and (b) sets forth the activities that are protected under the
Act relevant to this action3:

3

IC § 6-2104 states in full:
6-2104, Reporting of governmental waste or violation of law- Employer Action.(l Xa) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee, or a person authorized
to act on behalf of the employee, communicates in good fuith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or
manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a
political subdivision of this state or the United States. Such communication shall be made at a time and in a manner
whicb gives the employer reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation.
(b) For purposes of subsection (lXa) of this section. an empl~ee communicates in good faith if there is a
reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is lacking where the employee knew or reasonably
ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or frivolous.
(2) An employer may not take adverse actioo against an employee because an employee participates or gives
information in an investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of
administrative review.
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because tho employee has objected to or refused
to carry out a ditective that the employee reasonably believes violates a law or a rule or regulation adopted under the
authority of the laws of this state, political subdivision ofthis state or the United States.
(4) An employer may not imphmtent rules or policies that unreasonably restrict an employee's ability to dm:ument
the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation, or sus~ted violation of any laws,
rules or regulations.
Memorandum D«illion and Onler
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(l)(a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the
employee, or a person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, communicates in good
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or
suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a
political subdivision of this state or the United States. Such communication shall be
made at a time and in a manner which gives the employer reasonable opportunity to
conect the waste or violation.
(b) For purposes of subsection (l)(a) of this section, an employee communicates
in good faith if there is a reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is
lacking where the employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is
malicious, false or frivolous.
PMC does not dispute that it terminated the Plaintiff's employment, but takes issue with the
remaining elements of the prima facie case with respectto either of the Plaintiff's "government
waste" and/or "safety issues" theories.

a.

The Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity.

Under the Whist1eblower's Act, activity is protected if an employee "communicates in
good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or
suspected violation of1aw, rule or regulation ...."

IDAHO

CooEANN. § 6-2104(1)(a) (2007).

First, the Plaintiff is unable to show the existence of any waste of public funds, property or
manpower. Mr. Van claimed PMC lost revenue because the Life Flight helicopter was not ready
to "respond at a moment's notice" as portrayed in its advertisement. (Pl.'s Mem. in Resp. at 30.)
However, while the Plaintiff expressed concerns that the helicopter was not always airworthy, he
provided no evidence that the Life Flight helicopter actually missed a flight or that PMC lost
revenue because the helicopter was unable to fly.

Mr. Van further argued that PMC wasted taxpayer dollars by not incorporating his
recommendations regarding the maintenance contract ("COMP contract') in connection with the
Memorandum Deci<iion and Order
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e

e

possible procurement of an Agusta 109 E helicopter from Agusta Aerospace Corporation. (Id. at

14.) The Plaintiff"felt that the COMP contract was unworkable as far as securing assets to pay
Agusta for certain parts. He advised the head of Customer Service for Agusta ofhis concerns
and received assurances that things would be worked out. When it came time to sign the
contract, Agusta's representative would not put the assurances in writing." (Jd.) However, PMC
ultimately detennined that the agreement was satisfactory for the hospital, and the Plaintiff has
not been able to show that PMC wasted taxpayer dollars because it did not make his desired
changes to the COMP contract. The affidavit of Pamela Holmes indicates that Agusta bas
provided all parts needed for repair or replacement and no warranty issues have even been
nullified by Agusta because a mechanic was not factory-trained, as Mr. Van feared. (See Aff. of
Pamela K. Holmes, ,[113-14, Aug. 3, 2007.)
Furthermore, the Plaintiff cannot show that PMC violated any law, rule or regulation.
The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the Whistleblower Act does not apply to
violations, or suspected violations, of a public employer's internal policies. Mallonee v. Idaho,
139 Idaho 615, 619-20, 84 P.3d 551, 555-56 (2004). The Plaintiff claimed be bas proven he
engaged in protected activity by raising sixteen (16) "safety issues." (See Pl.'s Mem. in Resp. at
3~7.)

However, none of these "safety issues" implicate a law, rule or regulation. Instead, the

Plaintiff's allegations pertain to Life Flight internal policies and procedures. Therefore, none of
a11eged safety violations trigger activity protected by the Whistleblower Act. The Plaintiff's
allegations regarding safety issues more aptly pertain to pilot management practices and involve
the Plaintiff's issues of trust with pilots. Potential violations of Federal Aviation Regulations
Memorandum DerisiGo and Order
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I

were investigated and no violation oflaw was found. As such, these incidents do not rise to the
level of a violation of a law, rule or regulation.

b.

The Plaintiff cannot provide evidence that be was terminated because
he engaged in protected activity.

Even if the Plaintiff had demonstrated that be engaged in protected activity, he still is
unable to establish the nexus requirement of the prima facie case. Pursuant to tbe
Whistleblower's Act, the Plaintiff must show that he was terminated because he communicated
"the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected
violationofalaw,ruleorregulation ...." lDAHOCODEANN. § 6-2104(1)(a)(2007). As
mentioned, there is no dispute that PMC took an adverse action against the Plaintiff by ftring
him. However, the evidence shows that PMC's motivation to terminate the Plaintiff's
employment was related to his inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations with his
colleagues and his inability to foster a positive team environment The record shows that the
Plaintiff had severe distrust issues with the pilots and was unable to accept solutions unless those
solutions were his own suggestions. The Plaintiff's attitude led to dysfunction within the Life
Flight program, and the wasting and safety issues he raised did not occur contemporaneously
with his termination.

3.

Whether the Plaintiff's termination was a breach of public policy, breach of
contract and/or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealin2..

In his Memorandum in Response, the Plaintiff faj}s to set forth any facts to support his
claims for breach of pubHc policy, breach of contract and/or breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The Plaintiff states: "Sufficient evidence ... exists to create a genuine issue of
Memorandum Decision and Order
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material fact as to the hospital's breach of public policy, the breach of their implied contract of
employment ... and their breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." (Mem.
in Resp. to Summ. J. at 31.)
The Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that his tennination falls within a recognized public
policy exception. "The public policy exception bas been held to protect employees who refuse to
commit unlawful acts, who perform important public obligations, or who exercise certain legal
rights or privileges." Sorensen v. Comm. Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990).
There is no evidence that PMC asked the Plaintiff to "com:rnit unlawful acts" and that he refused
to do so, that he was fired for "performing important public obligations," or that he was
terminated for "exercise[ing] certain legal rights or privileges." Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme
Court has determined it was not a violation of public policy to terminate an employee for
disclosing documents allegedly showing environmental pollution, as long as that disclosure was
unrelated to the termination. Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175, 178-79, 16 P.3d 272,276-77
(2000). This Court has already determined that the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a nexus between
his concerns regarding the Life Flight program and his termination.
Moreover, it is clear from the record that the Plaintiff was an at-will employee and could
be terminated for any reason. It is also clear that the Plaintiff was aware of his status. (Ex. A,
Dep. of Mark C. Van, attached to McFarlane Aff.) There is no evidence that PMC breached any
contract As such, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to this basis is hereby
GRANTED.
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B.

Whether to grant the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.

As this Court has granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and further
determined that the Plaintiff's concerns regarding the COMP contract were unfounded, this
Court hereby DENIES the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order Granting
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order.
C.

Whether the Defendants are entitled to costs and fees.

PMC also asserted it is entitled to an award of the costs and fees it incurred in
successfully defending against the Plaintiffs claim under IC § 6-2101 and against the Plaintiffs
claims for breach of express and implied contract terms.
1.

Whistleblower claim.

Idaho Code § 6-21 ot provides for an award of attorneys' fees and costs to an employer
if the court determines that the action was brought without basis in law or fact While this Court
has determined that the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblower

Act, Mr. Van did not bring his Wbistleblower action "without basis in law or fact." As such, this
Court declines to award attorney fees to the Defendants on this basis.
2.

Breach of contract claims.

PMC also argued it is entitled to an award of the attorney fees it incurred in defending
against the Plaintiffs breach of contract claims, including his claims for breach of express and
.. 6-2107. Award of attorneys' fees and costs to employer- Adion without basis in law or fact.- A court may
also order that reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs be awarded to an employer if the court determines that an
action brought by an employee under this chapter is without basis in law or in fact. However, an employee shall not
be assessed attorneys' fees under this section if. after exercising reasonable and diligent efforts after filing a suit. the
employee files a voluntary dismissal concerning the employer, within a reasonable time after determining ~the
employer would not be liable for damages.
Memorandum DecisioD and Order
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implied contract terms and a violation of the implied covenant of good faith. Pursuant to IC §
12-120(3), attorney fees are recoverable in an action on a contract for personal services. That
section states in pertinent part "In any civil action to recover on ... [a] contract relating to ...
services ... , the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the
court, to be taxed and collected as costs., Furtbetmore, the Idaho Supreme Court has
specifically determined that the employer is entitled to recover fees incurred in defending against
claims for an implied contract, inc1uding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Atwood v.

W. Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 234,240-41, 923 P.2d 479,485-86 (1996) ("(A]ctions on employment
contracts are subject to the attorney fee provisions of I. C.§ 12-120(c)." When an employer
successfully defends against claims for breach of express and implied contract terms, including
the claim for violation of the implied covenant of good faith, such employer should be granted
attorney fees.)
As this Court has determined the Plaintiff's termination was not a violation of contract or
a breach of public policy or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Defendants, pursuant
to IC § 12-120(3), are entitled to an award of those costs and fees reasonably and necessarily
incurred in defending against such claims.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff failed to fulfill the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort
Claims Act, requiring a dismissal of the Plaintiff's tort claims, including those for emotional
distress. Furthennore, the Plaintiff failed to meet the prima facie case of the Whistleblower's
Memorandum Decision aod Order
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Act by failing to show that PMC committed any waste of public funds, property or manpower or
violated any law, rule or regulation. Further, the Plaintiff was unable to establish the nexus
requirement since he failed to show he was terminated because he communicated the existence
of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a
law, rule or regulation. In addition, this Court determined that the Plaintiff was unable to
demonstrate that his tennination was a breach of public policy, breach of contract and/or a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
This Court also DENIES the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration since the Defendants
prevailed on the summary judgment motion, and the Plaintiff's concerns regarding the COMP
contract were unfounded.
Lastly, the Plaintiff failed to state any cause of action ag-.Unst the individually named
Defendants. There is no evidence that any of these individuals were Mr. Van's employer under
the Whistleblower's Act, that any of them entered into a contract with the Plaintiff or that the..-;e
Defendants were acting outside of the course and scope of their employment. As such, these
Defendants are not liable to "Mr. Van. This Court hereby DISMISSES the individually named
Defendants, including Does I~X.
The Defendants are entitled to reasonable costs and fees pursuant to IC § 12-120(3).
However, this Court declines to grant fees under IC § 6-2107 since it determined that the
Plaintiff did not bring his Whistleblower action "without basis in law or fact''
The Plaintiffs Complaint against all the Defendants is hereby dismissed with prejudice,
and the Defendants are awarded judgment against the Plaintiff for attorney's fees and court costs
Memorandum Decision and Order
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reasonably incurred. Counsel for the Defendants shall submit an appropriate memorandum of
costs and judgment for this Court's signature. The jury trial set to commence February 5, 2008,
is vacated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

-

3" day of October, 2007.
PETER D. MCDERMOTT
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Nick Nielson
Paul D. McFarlane
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In the Supreme Court ofthe State of Idaho
MARKVAN,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

)
)

v.
POR1NEUF MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent-Cross
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 38793-2011
Bannock County Docket No. 2005-4053

RESPONDENT POR1NEUF MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
RECORD and an AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA M. OLSSON IN SUPPORT OF PMC'S MOTION
TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD were filed by counsel for Respondent on July 2, 2013. Therefore,
good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S MOTION SUPPLEMENT RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED in part, and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, file-stamped October 17, 2005;
2. Judgment, file-stamped November 9, 2007.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
RECORD be and hereby is, DENIED in part, without prejudice, as the documents listed below do not
bear a legible file stamp.
1. Answer to Complaint.
2. Memorandum Decision and Order
DATED this ..:if:day of July, 2013.

cc: Counsel ofRecord
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE
RECORD- Docket No. 38793-2011

NO. 3583

MAR.23.2006 5:26PM

P. 4
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Response due
t

David E. Gabert, Esq.
Attorney at Law

r. s . B .

~1/1/tXe

l,../
Calendared..__ _
_ _ __

#3 2 a5

...Tlckloo_ _ _ _
_ _ __
~

845 West Center, Suite C
1?.0. Box 4267
Po~atello, Idaho
83205-4267
Telephone: (208) 233-9560

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TBE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MARK VAN,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

PETER D. McDERMOTT

vs.

PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER 1 PAT

)

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND

)

FOR JtJ'RY TRIAL

HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator, )
PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director,)
GARY ALZOLA, Director of
)
Operations, RON FERGIEr Chief
)
Pilot/Safety Officer 1 BARRY
)
NIELSON, Pilot, and DOES I-X,
)
)
)

Defendants.

------------~------------------->

COMES NOW Plaintiff 1 MARK VAN, by and through his attorney,

David E. Gabert, Esq., and for cause of action against Defendants
alleges as follows:
PARTIES
I.

At all times material herein, Plaintiff has been a resident of
the City of Pocatello, County of Eannock, State of Idaho.
II.

At

all times material herein,

Defendant,

PORTNBUF MEDICAL

CENTER/ is a Public Governmental Entity doing business in the City

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1

LOCATION:

RX TJME

03/23 '06 17:23
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of Pocatello,

County of Bannock,

State of Idaho.

P. 5

Defendant's

current address is ae follows:
Portneuf Medical Center, West
651 Memorial Drive
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
II!.

At all times material herein, Defendant, PAT HERMANSON, is the
Adminstrator
responsible

of
for

Portneuf
the

Medical

decision

to

Center,

and

terminate

Hermanson is also a resident of the county of

is

ultimately

employment.
~annock,

Pat

State of

Idaho.
IV.
At all times material herein, Defendant, PAM HUMPHREY, is the

Program Director of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Office of
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER.

Ms. Humphrey is also a resident of the

County of Bannock, State of Idaho.

v.
At all times material herein, Defendant, GARY

ALZO~,

is the

Director of Operations of the EMS Office of PORTNEUF MEDICAL
CENTER.

Mr. Alzola is als'o a resident of the County of Bannock,

State of Idaho.
VI.

At all times material herein, Defendant, RON FERGIE, is the
Chief Pilot/Safety Officer of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
Office of PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER.

Mr. Fergie is aleo a resident

of the County of Bannock, state of Idaho.
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'Vli.

At all times material herein, Defendant, BARRY NIELSON, is a
Pilot for the EMS Office of PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER.

Mr. Nielson

is a resident of the county of Power, State of Idaho.

VIII.

At

all

timee

material

herein,

DOES

I-X

are

officers,

directors, employees or agents of Portneuf Medical Center.
JURISDIC'l'ION AND VENUE

IX.
Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference
each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered

I

through VIIl above.
X.
The above-entitled court has jurisdiction to hear the instant
matter pursuant to section 6-2101 et seg. of the Idaho Code, and
venue is proper in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for the
County of Bannock.
FACTUAL BASES FOR CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS
XI,

Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference
each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered l
through 2C above.

..

XII.

In 1984,

Plaintiff,

Mark Van,

began working for Freedom

Helicopters, a private corporation contracted with then Bannock
Medical

Center

to

provide

Emergency

Medical

Services

(EMS)
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. helicopter support.
Regional
services.

P. 7

In 1985, Portneuf Medical Center, then Bannock

Medical

Center,

became

the

operator

of 'EMS

flight

Plaintiff was contracted by Bannock Regional center as

the Director of Maintenance for the EMS flight services.

rn 1986,

Plaintiff became a full-time employee of Bannock Regional Medical

Center as the Director of Maintenance for the EMS flight services
under its l35 Air Carrier certificate.

regional

medical

helicopter

flight

EMS provides emergency

services

for

patients

of

l?ortneuf Medical Center and operates under the name uLite Flight."
XIII.

On or about the weekend of October 30/31, 2004, Greg Stoltz,

•

a Life Flight mechanic inspected the Life Flight helicopter and
found the aircraft covered with ice and snow.

Mr. Stoltz went to

the maintenance shop to notify the pilot, Defendant, Barry Nielson,
about the condition of the aircraft, specifically to indicate that

it was unairworthy; however, he was unable to contact Mr. Nielson.
Mr. Stoltz thereafter returned from the maintenance shop less than
five (5) minutes later to witness Mr. Nielson lifting off from the
helipad in direct violation of Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR)
135.227, and causing a potential safety hazard by flying with ice

on the main rotors by creating an imbalance in the rotors, and/or
by flinging ice outward from the rotors into the public space.

XIV.
Mr.

Stolt;;: notified Plaintiff of the incident on Monday,

November 1st,

2004.

Plaintiff then reported the incident to

Defendant, Ron Fergie, who represented that he would conduct an
COMPLAJ:'NT AND DEMAND FOR ~y 'l.'RI.AL -

4

.·
LOCATION:

RX TIME

03/23 '06 17:23

000645

NO. 3583

MAR. 23.2006 5:27PM

investigation.
incident,

After Mr. Fergie spoke with Mr. Stoltz about the

Plaintiff

incident was

11

P. 8

spoke with . Mr.

Fergie

who

said that

the

nothing."

XV.

In response to the apparent lack of concern exhibited

by Ron

Fergie about this incident, Plaintiff sent to Ron Fergie and to
Defendant, Gary Alzola, a set of recommendations for protecting the
aircraft

in

inclimate

weather

to

ensure

maximum

operational

readiness and safety.
XVI.

Nevertheless, over the course of the winter of 2004/2005, the
maintenance department found several

instances

of · ice on the

helicopter's main rotor blades underneath the main rotor blade
covers.

Since ice should not develop underneath the blade covers

if the blades have been properly de-iced, Plaintiff deduced that
the pilots had been replacing the blade covers without first
cleaning the blades of ice and snow, thereby causing the aircraft
to be unairworthy.

This deduction was later confirmed after Ron

Fergie later admitted this practice to J?laintiff.

Since the

aircraft is intended to be ready at a rnoment 1 s notice to respond to
an emergency, this practice was unacceptable as it would either
delay takeoffs in order to clean the blades or would otherwise
endanger the safety of patients and of the flight

staff,

and

Plaintiff reminded Mr. Fergie that he had recommended the previous
autumn that the blades be wiped down before installing the main
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rotor blade covers to avoid an unairworthy condition when the
temperature dipped below freezing.
XVII.

Plaintiff thereafter spoke with junior pilot, Chad Waller, who
was present on one ot the occasions when the rotor blades covers
had been installed over wet and snow covered blades.

Mr. Waller

informed Plaintiff that after he had started to wipe off the blades
to install the main rotor blade covers that Mr. Fergie had rebuked
him telling him that it was not necessary since the snow comes
right off when the covers are installed.

Accordingly, Mr. Waller

went along with Mr. Fergie's orders, despite the fact that he knew
that this was not the case.
XV!II.
On February l, 2005, Plaintiff drafted a written report wbich
'~s

sent to Gary Alzola and Pam Rumphrey.

The report cited the

safety problems with pilots replacing rotor blade covers over wet,
or snow, or ice covered rotor blades.

Mr. Alzola and Ms. Humphrey

responded that Mr. Fergie had done nothing wrong and that this
practice did not pose a safety issue.

XIX.

on February 25, 2005, Earry Nielson accosted Plaintiff and
implicity threatened him for reporting the October, 2004, incident
involving his flight with ice on the main rotor blades,
XX.

On February 28, 2005, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with

Mr. Alzola, Ms. Humphrey, and Mr. Fergie.

Mr. Alzola, who was
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noticeably emotionally upset at the time, told Plaintiff that only
a pilot could take an aircraft out of service and that it was not
his

(Plaintiff's)

responsibility to do

so.

Mr.

Alzola also

informed Plaintiff that the issue of flying with ice on the rotor
blades was between the FAA and the pilots and that it was none of
In addition, Mr. Fergie informed the group present

his business.

that Mr. Nielson had not flown with ice on the rotor blades in
October of 2004, but that Mr. Stoltz had told him that there was
only frost on the blades, despite the fact that flying with frost
on the rotor blades would still constitute a violation of FAR
135.227(a).

XXI.

In response to this meeting, Plaintiff confronted Mr. Stoltz
about the October incident, and Mr. Stoltz confirmed that he had
actually witnessed ice and snow on the main rotor blades when Mr.
Plaintiff thereafter updated his existing

Nielson lifted off.

safety policy regarding taking an aircraft out of service,
reference to FAR 43. :Ll.

in

The updated policy provided that while the

mechanics would not take an unairworthy aircraft out of service,
they would make an entry into the aircraft logbook declaring that
the aircraft is unairworthy and would notify dispatch that the
aircraft was unairworthy.
XXII.
Plaintiff attempted to raise several safety issues in a Life
Flight meeting conducted ·on March 24, 2005.
not

present

at

the

meeting,
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indicated she would call a special unscheduled safety meeting to
address Plaintiff's concerns a few days

later.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff sent e-mails to most of the Life Flight nurses and
paramedics, as well as to Mr. Fergie and Ms. Humphrey notifying
them of the specific issues he wanted to raise at the safety
meeting.
XXIII.
On April 4, 2005, at a Human Resources meeting, Ms. Humphrey
told Plaintiff that

she had no

intention of calling a safety

meeting, telling him that the issue had already been dealt with,
and accusing Plaintiff of

merely attempting to embarrass Mr.

Fergie.
XXIV,

!

On April 20/ 2005, Plaintiff was terminated as an employee of
Portneuf Medical Center.

In his termination letter prepared by Pam

Humphrey and Dale Mapes, Plaintiff was accused of being "unable to
maintain positive interpersonal relations with [his] colleagues",
and failing to

11

foster a positive team environment. 11

Plaintiff

alleges that the only bases for such accusations relate directly to
the fact that he had reported FAR violations and related misconduct
of his

f~llow

employees as they pertained to safety and operational

readiness of Life Flight aircraft.
COUNT l
WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

XXV.

Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8

..
l.DCATION:

RX TIME

03/23 '06 17:23

000649

MAR. 23.2006 5:28PM

each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered r
through XXIV above.
XXVI.

Plaintiff alleges as a result of the foregoing conduct of
Defendants,

as described hereinabove,

that his employment was

terminated in violation of Section 6-2101 et

se~.,

of the Idaho

Code, and contrary to public policy, because he had reported in
good faith the existence of waste of public funds and/or violations
or suspected violations of the law, and that, as such, Plaintiff is
entitled to a claim for wrongful termination of employment.

COUNT II
BREACH OF CON'l'AAC'l'

XXVII.
Plaintiff re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference
each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered I
through XXVI above.

xxvrrr,
Plaintiff alleges that he was employed subject to a contract
o.f employment with Defendant, PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER.

That he was

entitled to the terms, conditions, and protection of his employment
contract with Defendant, and that as a result of the conduct of
Defendants, as described hereinabove, the policies and procedures
of Defendant, PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, were violated with regards
to Plaintift's employment, and that Defendant, PORTNEUF MEDICAL
CENTER,

breached

its policies

and procedures

in

terminating

Plaintiff from his employment and further breached the implied
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -
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contract

of good faith and fair dealing in its decision to

terminate

~laintiff's

employment.
DAMAGES

XXIX.
~laintiff

re-alleges and reincorporates herein by reference

each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs numbered r
through XXVIII above.
XXX.

Plaintiff alleges that as a direct and/or proximate result of
the conduct

of Defendants herein,

as

hereinbefore

described,

Plaintiff sustained damages including lost wages and benefits,
decreased earning capacity, costs required to relocate in order to
secure new income, and emotional distress and suffering, all in an
amount to be proven at the trial of this matter.
:XXXI.

Plaintiff further

a~leges

that he is entitled to injunctive

relief to restrain Defendants from continued violations of FAR
safety regulations under the provisions of Idaho Code, Section 62106.

XXXII.
Plaintiff further alleges that he is entitled to reinstatement
of h:i.s position,

including the reinstatement of full wages and

benefits and seniority rights under the provisions of Idaho Code,
Section 6-2106.
XXXIII.

Plaintiff further alleges that he is entitled to an award of
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attorney's fees and costs for bringing the instant cau::le of action,
pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 6-2106, and Section 12-121 1 in an
amount to be proven at the trial of this matter.

In the event this

matter ls uncontested, Plaintiff alleges that his attorney's fees
will be FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000.00).
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff

demands

a

trial

by

jury

in

the

above-entitled

matter 1 pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE,

Plaintiff prays that upon examination into this

matter as required by law that an Order be issued by the Court for
the following:
1.

For an award of special and general compensatory damages

in the such reasonable amount as may be awarded by the jury for the
wrongful conduct of Defendants 1 as hereinbefore describedi and
2.

For injunctive relief as set forth hereinabove; and

3.

For reinstatement of his position, wages, benefits, and

seniority rights, as set forth above; and
4.

For an award of Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees

and costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as set forth
abovei and
5.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem

just and equitable in the premises.
DATED this

~day

of October 1 2005.

DQ~~

Attorney for Plaintiff
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 11

11/07/2006 TUE OS: 54

[TX/RX

~Q~ I4J 002

11/07/2005

09:53

EXECUTIVE

20823

PAGE

03/03

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of Bannock
I, MARK VAN, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says
as follows:
That he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that he
has read the above and foregoing COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL, knows the contents thereof and that the same are true to the
best of his knowledge.

Mark Van
Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBBD AND SWORN TO before me this

COMPLAINT

~

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

~

} ~fi-day

--~--~

of

12
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NOV 12 2007
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

MOFFA7T, THOMAS
_
ROCK & FIElDs' BARFlt n
.CHTO

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MARK VAN,
Case No. CV 2005-4053 OC
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT

vs.
PORTNEUF MED lCAL CENTER, PAT
HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator,
PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director,
GARY ALZOLA, Director of Operations,
RON FERGIE, Chief Pilot/Safety Officer,
BARRY NIELSON, Pilot, and DOES 1-X,
Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants PortneufMedica1 Center, Pat
Hermanson, Pam Humphrey, Gary Alzo1a, Ron Fergie and Barry Nielson havjng come before
the Court, and the matter having been fully briefed by the respective parties and oral argument
having been heard thereon; and
The Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having issued its
Memorandum Decision, Order and Judgment on October 30, 2007;

1T IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment on
Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby entered in favor of Defendants PortneufMedical Center, Pat
Hermanson, Pam Humphrey, Gary A1zo1a, Ron Fergie and Barry Nielson and against the

JUDGMENT-1

BOI_MT2:669128.1

00068J;h/0;

Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs causes of action are dismissed as against Defendants PortneufMedical
Center, Pat Hermanson, Pam Humphrey, Gary Alzola, Ron Fergie and Barry Nielson with
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants PortneufMedical Center, Pat
Hermanson, Pam Humphrey, Gary Alzola, Ron Fergie and Barry Nielson be awarded their costs
and attorney's fees incurred in defending this action pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l), l.R.C.P., the
amount of which will be determined following submission of an appropriate Memorandum of
Costs as provided under Rule 54(d)(5), l.R.C.P.
DATED this

J

-

day ofNover:tber, 2007.

(?~~

Honorable Peter D .. McDermott
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_f-~day

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
ofNovember, 2007, I caused a tme
and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Nick L Nielson

( tyt(s. Mail, Postage Prepaid

NIELSON LAW OFFICE

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

I 20 North I 2th A venue, Suite 7
Post Office Box 6159
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-6159
Facsimile (208) 232-0048
Patricia M. Olsson
Paul D. McFarlane
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile (208) 345-2000

(4-s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

~erk~
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